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A FREE-MARKET VIEW                              
ON ACCIDENTS AND TORTS 
ENRICO COLOMBATTO* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1960s, the activity of legislators has attracted increasing 
attention from the economics profession. In particular, many economists of the 
modern law-and-economics tradition have taken a consequentialist approach, 
focusing on how to utilize lawmaking and judicial rulings to efficiently obtain 
social goals.1 Under the neoclassical-law-and-economics approach, for example, 
the politician should select the social goals and the economist should identify 
those instruments—including taxation, regulation, and other encroachments on 
private-property rights—most appropriate for obtaining these predefined social 
goals.2 
The neoclassical-law-and-economics literature has not aroused great 
enthusiasm among free-market supporters.3 Free-market advocates hold that all 
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 1.  See Charles Rowley, An Intellectual History of Law and Economics: 1793-2003, in THE 
ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS 3, 7 (Francesco Parisi & 
Charles K. Rowley eds., 2007) (noting that references to efficiency to justify and assess policy making 
date back to Adam Smith). In recent times, the consequentialist approach to property rights has been 
made explicit by many authors. See generally, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX 
WORLD (1995); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967); 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); Richard Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757 
(1975). Of course, not all economists engage in consequentialist inquiry. Thus, economists of the public-
choice school have studied how individuals make use of politics to create and exploit privileges. See 
generally, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 
(2003) (standard textbook on public-choice theory); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); Benoît Le Maux, Governmental 
Behavior in Representative Democracy: A Synthesis of the Theoretical Literature, 141 PUB. CHOICE 447 
(2009) (providing the briefest account of public-choice theory out of the cited sources). (In a word, the 
school of public choice makes use of the traditional tools of neoclassical economics in order to analyze 
the world of politics (including policies, decision-making mechanisms, the behavior of politicians, 
bureaucrats and voters).) 
 2.  See, e.g., Richard Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Things as 
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1994). 
 3.  Yet free-market advocates have not been absent from the law-and-economics agenda. Henry 
Manne, see generally THE COLLECTED WORKS OF HENRY G. MANNE (Fred McChesney ed., 2009), 
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individuals have a right to be free from coercion and have a duty to not violate 
the liberty and property rights of others. In this light, the role of government is 
to protect individuals from violence, while the role of the judiciary is to enforce 
contracts and to adjudicate the use of violence. The state cannot force 
individuals to consume public goods, and the judiciary must abstain from 
introducing regulation and assigning property rights.4 Thus, free-market 
supporters feel uneasy about tampering with private-property rights and 
engaging in extended policy making, even if such policy making would aid in 
the efficient achievement of social goals. 
Guido Calabresi is often associated with the neoclassical-law-and-economics 
tradition. His 1961 article, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of 
Torts, was one of the seminal works that gave rise to the modern law-and-
economics research program.5 Yet Calabresi—as he expresses his view on 
accidents and torts in that article—offers key methodological insights that keep 
him distanced from the mainstream neoclassical tradition and that should in fact 
be appreciated by free-market supporters. In particular, Calabresi is wary of 
rule making and rule overhauling that is driven only by efficiency concerns.6 He 
is also reluctant to accept technocratic planning even in the presence of 
uncertain costs. In a word, Calabresi’s contribution is an interesting still-
neoclassical alternative to the traditional Chicago view.7 Embedded in 
Calabresi’s view is a better understanding not only of the distinctive features of 
the free-market approach to liability, but also of other issues currently debated, 
such as the consequences of the Lockean view of property rights and the role 
and limits of institutional analysis.8 
 
and, from a broader perspective, Bruno Leoni, see generally Bruno Leoni, FREEDOM AND THE LAW 
(1961), have actually made pathbreaking contributions to this literature. See also MARIO RIZZO, 
AUSTRIAN LAW AND ECONOMICS (2011) (offering a comprehensive view on the connection between 
the Austrian free-market approach and the law). 
 4.  See MURRAY ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY (1982); MURRAY ROTHBARD, THE 
LOGIC OF ACTION TWO 286–87 (1987). For the purpose of this article, “free-market view” is defined as 
the school of thought that originated from the Scottish Enlightenment, evolved into classical liberalism, 
see WILHELM HUMBOLDT, THE LIMITS OF STATE ACTION 137–38 (1852), and later became what is 
now known as the Austrian school of economics, see CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 
(1871) ; LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION 492–93 (1949); MURRAY ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY 
AND STATE 304 (1962). 
 5.  70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). 
 6.  Moreover, when Calabresi does consider efficiency—that is, cost minimization—his calculus 
diverges from the neoclassical tradition. Unlike the neoclassical school, Calabresi defines the term 
“cost” to mean “social cost” and takes into account social justice, which legitimizes redistribution 
regardless of (allocative) efficiency. See Roger Van den Bergh, Introduction: The Impact of Guido 
Calabresi on Law and Economics Scholarship, 1 ERASMUS L. REV., no. 4, 2008, at 1, 2 (Neth.).   
 7.  Although members of the Chicago school are generally wary of government intervention, they 
are not necessarily supportive of the free-market view. As mentioned earlier, the linchpin of the 
Chicago view is efficiency (wealth maximization), rather than individual freedom. This has 
consequences. For example, in the aftermath of the recent financial and public-debt crises, free-market 
advocates have been arguing for outright deregulation, while Chicago scholars have generally been in 
favor of better regulation. See, e.g., Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation 34–35 (Chicago 
Booth Sch. Bus., Paper No. 08-27, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319648. 
 8.  See, e.g., HARDY BOUILLON, BUSINESS ETHICS AND THE AUSTRIAN TRADITION IN 
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To illustrate this claim, in the next subparts I briefly clarify the nature of the 
costs to which liability applies—the focus of Calabresi’s 1961 article.9 I also 
review Calabresi’s arguments on how to legislate for efficient cost allocation in 
the realm of accidents and torts. I then proceed in parts II and III to investigate 
the free-market perspective regarding two sets of situations in which uncertain 
costs play a role—respondeat superior and limited liability—and assess the 
difference between the free-market perspective and Calabresi’s approach. I 
conclude in part IV by drawing attention to key issues for the future of 
institutional economics broadly understood. 
A. On the Nature of Uncertain Costs 
Uncertainty plays a crucial role in the free-market context, because it 
creates opportunities for entrepreneurial endeavors, which in turn are the 
handmaiden of growth. Free-market supporters particularly draw on Frank 
Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty and Profit to classify uncertain costs in three 
categories.10 The first are “risky costs”: costs the nature and probability of which 
is known. For example, most drivers know there is chance their car will be 
stolen during the next six months and that, as a consequence, the cost of using 
that car might suddenly increase, because when the theft occurs the residual 
value of the vehicle drops to zero. Drivers can easily acquire information about 
the likelihood of theft and buy insurance. 
Another kind of uncertain costs is “potential costs”: Their nature is known, 
but their probability distribution is not. A typical example is an earthquake: 
People know it might come one day, but most have vague or no ideas about 
when and how extensive the damage will be. In most cases people can buy 
insurance, although the price of the policy is necessarily erratic. 
Finally, a third source of uncertain costs can be defined as “accidents,” the 
very nature of which is unknown. For example, a builder completes the 
construction of a house with materials that years later turn out to have 
unhealthy features that had been previously ignored or severely 
underestimated.11 Under these circumstances, of course, insurance is not 
 
ECONOMICS (2011); Tom Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of 
Property Rights and Ideal Objects, HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 (1990); R.N. Langlois, What is Wrong 
with the Old Institutional Economics (and What is Still Wrong with the New), 1 REV. POL. ECON. 270 
(1989). 
 9.  Calabresi, supra note 5. 
 10.  See MISES, supra note 4, at 289 (citing FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 
211–13 (1921)); Armen Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211, 
212–14 (1950). 
 11.  Admittedly, the notion of “unknown” suggests that the difference between potential costs and 
accidents could be faint. For example, Strabo and Pliny the Elder had noticed that something was 
wrong with asbestos, but their concerns were not taken very seriously. Roberta C. Barbalace, A Brief 
History of Asbestos Use and Associated Health Risks (Dec. 11, 2013, 11:37 AM), 
http://environmentalchemistry.com/yogi/environmental/asbestoshistory2004.html. When and why did 
asbestos cease to be a source of accidental costs and turned into certain harm? Surely, at the time, 
sellers of asbestos-intensive products were not considered criminals.  
  For the purpose of my discussion, an accident is a situation in which there is no strong evidence 
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available, unless it is included in very comprehensive policies against all kinds of 
illness. 
Although in the law-and-economics literature the word “accident” usually 
means “unintentional injury,”12 it is important to underscore the unknown 
nature of the accidental event (as opposed to its unintentional component). The 
issue I analyze is not whether Calabresi or a free marketeer would say that one 
can insure against unintentional injury, but rather what Calabresi or a free 
marketeer would say ought to be done in the presence of unexpected damage, 
and whether either would say that an individual can still be held liable if he has 
no possibility of taking action against accidental harm. Moreover, dealing with 
the unknown nature of accidents widens the debate from the realm of allocative 
efficiency to that of ethics and distributive justice, which seems to be 
particularly appropriate in the context proposed by Calabresi. 
B. Calabresi and the Resource-Allocation Approach 
What is the role of uncertain costs in Calabresi’s and the free-market 
advocate’s frameworks? Since the marginalist revolution, the normative view 
argued by the economics profession has been the resource-allocation approach. 
Put simply, this approach maintains that individual behavior in the marketplace 
produces efficient outcomes as long as prices are a good measure of scarcity. 
Both free-market supporters and Calabresi13 accept this argument and add that 
the buyer and the seller should bear the full cost of their decisions, because the 
buyer and seller are in the best position to know whether the value of one unit 
of good X is greater or smaller than the value of what they could buy with PX.
14 
In the view of Calabresi and free-market supporters, forcing the seller to accept 
a price that does not compensate him for the sacrifice of giving away X would 
unjustifiably violate his preferences.15 Further, there is no reason to ask third 
parties (society) to subsidize the purchase of goods and services that they are 
unwilling to buy.16 
In contrast with the free-market view, however, Calabresi warns that 
efficiency and cost minimization are not the only factors involved and thus, he 
argues, rule making should mimic the resource-allocation approach only when 
the nature of property rights is ambiguous.17 Because uncertain costs generate 
 
about the chain of causality leading to an adverse event or about the harmful content of a transaction; 
moreover, I let the judge decide when withholding relevant information is fraudulent.  
 12.  See, e.g., Alan Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the 
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 567 (1988).  
 13.  See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 505. 
 14.  See, e.g., FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 71 (1960) (asserting that all 
individuals should bear the costs of their decisions); Calabresi, supra note 5, at 513. 
 15.  See sources cited supra note 14.  
 16.  See sources cited supra note 14. 
 17.  See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 503–04. For example, Calabresi mentions a situation in which a 
worker is injured on duty and the injury is caused partly by his own negligence and partly by the 
hazardous facilities of the location where he operates. Calabresi, supra note 5, at 505.  
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ambiguity, one may assign liability to reduce deadweight losses (allocative 
inefficiencies), to promote the purchase of insurance at the lowest price, or to 
share the burden.18 Calabresi concludes that when damages are not exceedingly 
high, monopolistic enterprises should be held liable, because paying the costs of 
accidents would merely erode the enterprises’ monopolistic rents with no 
further consequences, such as a drop in output.19 
Calabresi further argues that, in competitive environments, even default 
liability for uncertain costs should be assigned to the seller–producer, although 
for different reasons than other sorts of liability should be so assigned: The 
seller–producer is presumably in a better position to evaluate the nature and 
probability distribution of risky events, to contract away at least part of the cost 
to third parties, or to do both.20 However, Calabresi also finds that in some 
contexts, the burden of uncertain costs could be absorbed or spread by 
introducing a state insurance program financed by taxpayers at large21 or by 
levying a lump-sum tax on all producers subject to uncertain costs.22 In his view, 
this solution (taxation) is more appealing (1) in the presence of accidents and 
substantial judicial costs, (2) when enterprise liability might drive some 
companies out of business, leading to significant secondary effects, such as 
lower output and more unemployment, or (3) when the activities involved are 
extrahazardous.23 In short, consistent with the Chicago school but in contrast 
with the free-market vision, Calabresi admits that there are situations in which 
 
 18.  See Calabresi, supra note 5.  
 19.  See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 524–27. Calabresi’s argument includes two implicit assumptions. 
First, rents are undeserved and, therefore, no social harm is produced when they are reduced. Second, 
because no marginal firm would be hit, production would not fall, which is desirable because in 
monopolized industries production is already suboptimal.  
 20.  Calabresi, supra note 5, at 506–07. 
 21.  See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 529. A similar argument was already put forward in Young B. 
Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1923). Yet this author did not engage in any 
utilitarian accounting, merely claiming that it would be socially more expedient to frame the law to 
encourage the master to buy insurance. Id. at 460–61. 
  Calabresi is rather wary of the loss-spreading mechanism provided by private-insurance 
schemes. In his view, whenever a producer buys insurance, the producer still generates a significant loss 
to other parties: either consumers, who would be charged higher prices, or producers, who would be 
offered lower wages and prices. Calabresi, supra note 5, at 519. These secondary effects would be 
magnified in a stagnant or declining economy, but would be relatively modest in monopolistic 
industries, in which the monopolistic firm would be more likely to translate higher costs into lower 
profits, rather than into lower output and lower demand for inputs. Calabresi, supra note 5, at 524−25. 
Under such circumstances, of course, the cost of accidents would be spread among the company 
shareholders.  
 22.  See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 517–24. A lump-sum tax on producers would not affect marginal 
costs. Thus, prices and quantities would remain constant in the short run. In the long run, however, 
some marginal producers would leave the market, or new (marginal) producers would abstain from 
entering. See id. Therefore, the difference between producer liability and state liability with a tax on 
production raises two issues. One relates to efficiency, because in the long run the incentive to avoid 
accidental costs would be smaller. See id. The other relates to the desirability of redistribution among 
the sellers. In particular, a lump-sum tax would favor large, innovative firms, which would be required 
to pay a proportionally smaller tax and which would be more vulnerable to (unpredictable) accidents. 
See id.  
 23.  See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 541–42.  
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rule making can encroach upon individual freedom for the sake of efficiency, 
accepts that a victim has a right to compensation even in the absence of an 
identified tort feasor, and is open to the idea that property rights can be created 
and managed by government. 
In the rest of this article, Calabresi’s vision is examined by considering two 
different areas in which the law-and-economics literature has produced 
important contributions. One is the analysis of accidents within the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, the very area examined in Calabresi’s 1961 article24 and to 
which Guido Calabresi devoted considerable attention throughout his scholarly 
career. The other area regards limited-liability firms, a field in which, rather 
than following the general principle that the actor should be held liable for 
mishaps, most scholars have agreed to let the actor off the hook and pass at 
least part of the harm created by accidents to the victim. Thus, the case of 
limited-liability firms presents a perspective on default liability opposed to that 
of respondeat superior. The contrast shows how both Calabresi and free-market 
advocates can challenge the prevailing efficiency-based view of members of the 
Chicago school. 
II 
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR 
How far is Calabresi’s position from the free-market vision? As mentioned 
above, I try to shed light on this issue by looking at two areas: respondeat 
superior and firms’ limited liability. Respondeat superior refers to the legal 
doctrine that assigns liability to the principal for the damages provoked by 
agents who operate on his behalf. Respondeat superior illustrates that although 
the free-market perspective requires neither mandatory risk spreading nor state 
insurance, that perspective generates conclusions similar to those put forward 
by Calabresi. Likewise, a closer look at limited liability shows that efficiency is 
not necessarily compromised by the free-market rule that the owner–aggressor 
is always liable, regardless of intentionality. In contrast with Calabresi’s 
position, however, the presence of accidents strengthens the case for 
compliance with free-market guidelines, and the economic argument in favor of 
transforming accidental losses into a social burden at the expense of the 
taxpayer is vulnerable to criticism. 
A. Respondeat Superior: The Free-Market Perspective 
The free-market view emphasizes individual responsibility (the tort feasor is 
always liable)25 and explicit contractual commitment. By contrast, all kinds of 
 
 24.  See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 543.  
 25.  See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN, General Implications of Subjectivism in Economics, in 
WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS DO? 81 (1979); HAYEK, supra note 14; MISES, supra note 4; James M. 
Buchanan, Individual Choice in Voting and the Market, 62 J. POL. ECON. 334 (1954). On the difference 
between responsibility and liability, see, for example, Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65 J. 
PHIL. 674, 674 (1968) (distinguishing between responsibility, defined as the obligation running to the 
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implicit agreements are regarded with skepticism,26 even when the acceptance of 
these agreements might legitimize efficiency-enhancing regulation. Put 
differently, free-market advocates argue that unless somebody else explicitly 
accepts liability in the owner’s stead, the owner is always responsible (and 
liable) for the damage provoked by his actions or by objects that are his 
property. In particular, within the context of exchange, the seller is the owner 
until the transaction is completed; the buyer becomes the owner only after 
completion of the transaction. Identifying the principal and the agent, therefore, 
boils down to finding out whom the owner is and—in the case of a contractual 
transaction—who has signed the contract (or on behalf of whom the contract 
has been signed). Thus, by definition the agent is never liable unless he operates 
outside the contract with the principal, thereby becoming a principal himself. 
In a word, the respondeat superior problem vanishes altogether from a free-
market perspective. Compliance with the principles and implications of 
property ownership suffices. Certainly, tradition and habit could shape 
judicially enforced default rules that apply to incomplete contracts. Yet opting 
out of a default rule should always be permitted. 
B. Normative Consequences 
The free-market vision outlined above generates two normative 
consequences, depending on whether damage takes place during or after 
transaction. If damage occurs during the transaction—for example, if a 
company carries out maintenance works in a building and its employees 
(unintentionally) break a pipe or harm a resident—this event is equivalent to an 
encroachment on the residents’ private property or on their physical safety and 
health. In this case, the contractual counterparty is always the tort feasor, 
regardless of who is physical executor. Hence, if maintenance services are sold 
by the tort feasor’s agent, the agent is liable, because in this case the agent is in 
fact the principal, even if he pretends otherwise. On the other hand, if services 
are sold by the principal who then relies on the agent, the principal is liable. 
Of course, the above is true independent of the accidental nature of the 
event. The presence or absence of criminal intent also makes no difference, 
because in both cases the offender remains the owner and principal. However, 
when damage is accompanied by criminal intent, the eventual contractual 
transfer of liability from the seller to the buyer becomes void, and both the 
principal and his agent are liable. To illustrate this last point, consider a 
situation in which the seller (1) knowingly conceals risky or potential costs, so 
 
author of the damage (the aggressor, in our case) and liability, defined as the obligation to compensate 
the victim). According to the traditional vision, responsibility does not necessarily imply liability: 
“Liability requires the capacity to act, predictability of the consequences, and the possession of control. 
In the case of groups, their degree of unitary character is an added factor that must be considered.” 
Sven-Olof Collin, Bad Losers: An Investigation of the Morality of the Limited Liability of Shareholders 
in a Joint Stock Company, 30 J. ECON. ISSUES 283, 286 (1996).  
 26.  See, e.g., John Simmons, Locke’s State of Nature, 17 POL. THEORY 449, 463–65 (1989) 
(emphasizing that Locke should be read to require explicit consent to form a social contract).  
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as to increase the chances of closing a profitable deal, (2) induces the buyer to 
accept liability for all accidents, should they materialize, and (3) subsequently 
tries to persuade the buyer that the observed risky or potential costs were 
unpredictable and therefore accidental. For example, a builder might not 
mention that maintenance could involve damage to a pipe, thus leading to an 
extra charge to the residents. Under these circumstances, if both the agent and 
the principal knew about this possibility and kept silent, then both the agent 
and the principal are liable, because their behavior is equivalent to that of two 
accomplices who collude to induce the buyer to enter a contract he would not 
have signed if he had known the full story. 
A different conclusion applies when damages emerge after the transaction 
has been completed. For example, suppose that an individual buys a car that, 
though produced by a manufacturer, is sold by a dealer who is employed by the 
manufacturer and acting on its behalf. After a few months the car breaks down, 
possibly harming a fourth person as a consequence of the malfunction. How 
would the free-market liability principle work in this case? Of course, if the 
malfunction was possible or even likely (and therefore not accidental), and if 
this possibility was known to the manufacturer and the dealer but not the buyer, 
then under the free-market approach the buyer is liable to the fourth person, 
and the dealer and the manufacturer are accomplices and fully liable to the 
buyer, who fell victim to fraudulent behavior.27 By contrast, if the damage is 
completely unpredictable and therefore accidental, then neither the dealer nor 
the manufacturer can be held liable to the buyer, unless they explicitly accepted 
liability when signing the contract.28 In other words, because the accidental 
event took place after the buyer acquired full property rights, the driver cannot 
claim he has been harmed by the manufacturer or the dealer, and the seller 
should be discharged from all obligations. 
Therefore, from a free-market perspective, liability for nonaccidental 
damages is assigned according to the contractual agreement. Absent an explicit 
accord between the parties, the default rule prescribes that one should identify 
the victim, because there cannot be a tort feasor without a victim, and then 
identify the tort feasor (if there is one). In a contractual transaction, the tort 
feasor is always the owner of the good to be sold or the contractor that vows to 
perform given services. He is the principal, and by signing the contract, he takes 
responsibility and thus necessarily accepts liability. An employee selling or 
delivering a faulty car on behalf of his principal is indeed responsible and liable 
if he knows about the fraud. He becomes the principal’s accomplice, even if he 
 
 27.  However, if the dealer explicitly requested the buyer to bring in the car for periodic checkups 
and the buyer did not comply, then the buyer would be in breach of contract and the dealer off the 
hook.  
 28.  The driver would still be liable to the fourth person, though, because there is no doubt that the 
driver is the aggressor and that the victim never agreed to waive the driver’s liability. This contrasts 
with Calabresi, who refers to a car hitting a pedestrian and seems open to the idea of making the 
pedestrian liable if he happens to obtain lower insurance prices and thus enhance efficiency. Calabresi, 
supra note 5, at 506.  
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is a mere agent. But if he does not know, then only the principal is liable: the 
buyer’s counterparty is the principal, while the agent is the instrument used by 
the principal to fulfill the principal’s contractual obligation. By definition, 
however, the presence of an accident rules out fraud. Thus, the seller is liable 
until the transaction is completed, and unless a different agreement intervenes, 
the buyer must bear liability for accidents that occur after he has acquired full 
ownership. That there is a victim, but not an offender, is not enough to make 
the seller responsible for damages, because the seller can no longer be an 
offender after full ownership has been transferred. 
C. Respondeat Superior: Is Calabresi’s Position Really Different? 
The alternative to the free-market view on respondeat superior rests on two 
sets of arguments, both of which Calabresi articulated. One is based on cost 
minimization. Consistent with the line of theorizing dear to the neoclassical 
tradition, Calabresi maintains that the principal has better control than the 
agent over the economic activity at issue and has access to a wider range of 
remedies to contain the cost of the accident.29 Thus, because the principal is in a 
better position to contain the cost of the accident, he should be held liable. The 
second argument, on which I focus my attention, claims that the cost of the 
accident should fall on the rich, because the rich have deeper pockets and 
fairness requires that they bear the burden.30 (This is known as the ability-to-pay 
principle.) In particular, this line of thinking assumes that no buyer would ever 
do business with a counterpart who has little incentive to keep his word and 
who might not be able to compensate the buyer upon failure to deliver or 
exposure to damage or accident. The lawmaker (or judge) can thus infer that 
the principal’s pockets are necessarily deep and, therefore, the principal must 
be considered liable.31 
Clearly, the argument that the rich should pay implicates questions of the 
role and meaning of the principle of social justice (or fairness), which in turn is 
contingent on the existence and nature of the social contract. Regrettably, 
however, the debate on the social contract—and therefore the meaning of social 
justice—is far from settled. Some authors follow Thomas Hobbes in believing 
that the social contract exists and that it is implicit.32 Others support an 
 
 29.  See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 500–01.  
 30.  Id. at 527. 
 31.  As mentioned in Smith, supra note 21, almost a century ago Thomas Baty listed nine reasons 
that could explain the respondeat superior doctrine and concluded that there is only one real 
motivation, which boils down to deep pockets. THOMAS BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 196 (1916). A 
similar argument has also been made by Roscoe Pound, who referred to the “exigencies of social 
justice.” Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARV. L. REV. 
195, 233 (1914). 
 32.  See MICHAEL OTSUKA, LIBERTARIANISM WITHOUT INEQUALITY 115–16 (2003). An implicit 
social contract is also put forward in JAMES M. BUCHANAN & ROGER D. CONGLETON, POLITICS BY 
PRINCIPLE, NOT INTEREST: TOWARD NONDISCRIMINATORY DEMOCRACY (2006), in which the 
authors argue that when government intervention clearly makes everybody better off, it cannot be 
illegitimate. 
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interpretation of John Locke’s view, according to which the social contract 
exists only if it is explicit.33 And a third group of theorists follows John Rawls’s 
view that the social contract is legitimized regardless of people’s opinion as long 
as it derives from a shared set of hypotheses.34 By contrast, the free-market 
camp flatly denies the existence of any social contract.35 Because the terms 
“social justice” and “social responsibility” are based on the constitutive 
elements of the social contract, the free-market supporter, by denying that 
contract’s existence, rejects the notions of social justice and social responsibility. 
Consequently, the free-market supporter also rejects the notion that liability 
should fall on the rich because of their deeper pockets. Without a social 
contract that creates social responsibility, this liability would unjustifiably 
infringe upon the individual liberty of the rich. 
Thus, it appears that both the free-market supporter and Calabresi reject 
neoclassical efficiency and the Chicago school’s emphasis on material wealth as 
the only relevant standard for imposing liability. Rather, they underscore—the 
free-market advocate more so than Calabresi—that the allocation of liability 
should also take into account a metaprinciple of justice. Of course, the notion of 
justice is not the same: the free-market supporter maintains that justice consists 
in the preservation of freedom from coercion and in the protection of 
(uninfringeable) property rights.36 By contrast, Calabresi seems more inclined 
towards the ability-to-pay criterion. 
In other words, the free-market view chooses the Lockean–Rothbardian 
approach to property rights.37 The very nature of accidents rules out the 
existence of responsible tort feasors. The victim of an accident has no right to 
hold anybody liable or to ask for compensation. In fact, the whole respondeat 
superior doctrine becomes a moot issue. Regardless of who falls victim to the 
accident before the transaction is completed—the principal or the agent—the 
 
 33.  See, e.g., MICHAEL HUEMER, THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY: AN EXAMINATION 
OF THE RIGHT TO COERCE AND THE DUTY TO OBEY 21–22 (2012); ANTHONY DE JASAY, THE STATE 
40–41 (1985); David Hume, Of Civil Liberty, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 156 
(T.H. Green & T.H. Gross eds., Longmans Green & Co. 1889) (1742). 
 34.  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1972). 
 35.  See MICHAEL HUEMER, THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 58 (2013).   
 36.  See supra text accompanying note 4.  
 37.  To simplify, the Lockean property rule claims that an individual can appropriate a good in two 
ways. The first is voluntary transactions: Individual A receives the good from rightful owner B, either as 
a gift or in exchange for something else (such as money). The second way originates from the first user–
first owner principle: An individual can rightfully appropriate a resource as long as that resource has 
not been previously appropriated by somebody else. According to Locke’s Second Treatise on Civil 
Governments, the act of appropriation is effective when the individual makes use of that resource: 
“Whatsoever then he removes out of the state of nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his 
labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.” JOHN 
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENTS 26 (Lester DeKoster ed., 1978) (1690). 
  The Rothbardian view reproduces the Lockean structure, with an important addition: Once an 
individual has mixed his labor with the previously unappropriated resource (such as a piece of land), his 
property right to the resource is established for good, even if the mixing no longer takes place. See 
Rothbard, supra note 4. 
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buyer’s rights regarding the principal remain unaltered. If the accident occurs 
during the transaction, the buyer may hold the principal liable. On the other 
hand, if the accident hits the buyer after the transaction is completed, he can 
blame neither the principal nor the agent.38 
By contrast, Calabresi puts forward solutions that are both efficient and 
consistent with the expectations of public opinion (and are therefore just, one is 
tempted to add). Access to information and market power matter, and liability 
should be assigned to those allegedly better situated to tackle risky situations, 
buy cheap insurance, or both (typically principals, rather than agents). 
Moreover, when the deep-pocket or the asymmetric-information argument does 
not apply, the ultimate risk-spreading device—tax-financed subsidies covering 
accidental costs—becomes tempting. From Calabresi’s perspective, the 
underlying assumption is that because an accident is nobody’s fault, the lack of 
an offender makes society liable; and because the logic of collective action 
suggests that resistance to socializing losses is usually weak, forced solidarity 
obtains consensus and becomes morally acceptable.39 
Despite the differences with respect to the notion of social justice, however, 
Calabresi and the free-market supporter would agree on two important points. 
First, the allocation of liability should follow a default rule, according to which 
the principal is liable until the transaction is completed. Calabresi and the free-
market supporter also agree that default rules can be waived through a 
contractual agreement. Second, Calabresi’s argument for risk spreading when 
accidents occur and nobody is at fault is based not on efficiency, but on the 
existence of a hypothetical social contract. According to that social contract, 
when nobody is at fault, the whole community—rather than an individual—
should be considered a victim and thus suffer the consequences. Efficiency 
might play a role, of course, but it is not critical. The free-market supporter 
would also agree that efficiency is not critical, and would accept that risk 
spreading depends on the existence of a social contract. Yet, while Calabresi is 
happy with an implicit or hypothetical social contract, the free-market view 
would require that it be explicit.40 
 
 38.  Once again, from a free-market vantage point, the default rules are straightforward and 
depend on whether the cost is provoked by truly accidental circumstances. For example, there is no 
accident if the worker is negligent. Thus, the worker is responsible for his negligence and liable to his 
employer. By contrast, if the employer requires the employee to perform certain duties and the 
employee gets injured because, for example, the machine he is operating breaks down or the 
scaffolding collapses, then the employer is liable, insofar as he is the owner of the machine or 
scaffolding. 
  This also applies in the absence of a buyer. If an employee is struck by lightning while 
performing on behalf of his employer, the employer is not responsible. But suppose that an agent drives 
a truck owned by the principal and the driver is blinded by a sudden flash of light, loses control, and 
hits another vehicle. Then, unless the employer and his agent had previously agreed otherwise, the 
principal is liable, because he is the owner of the vehicle and (temporarily) of the labor input provided 
by the driver.  
 39.  See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 529–30. 
 40.  According to Locke, in the absence of an explicit social contract, the role of the state consists 
in protecting and enforcing individuals’ natural rights (physical integrity and property). See John 
6_COLOMBATTO_EIC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/6/2014  1:35 PM 
128 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 77:117 
III 
LIMITED-LIABILITY COMPANIES 
The case of limited-liability firms offers an interesting opportunity to 
analyze the law and economics of accidents from a different perspective. In 
contrast with the general principle typical of the respondeat superior doctrine, 
limited liability makes individuals external to firms—for instance, suppliers—
vulnerable to uncertainty regarding their own liability, especially when 
extrahazardous activities are involved. Under limited-liability rules, therefore, 
the firm’s owners become the beneficiaries of a kind of subsidy, which increases 
with the size of the uncertain costs and with the value of the shares in their 
possession. 
The traditional justification for limited liability relates to the alleged 
dynamic efficiency of limited-liability companies, as well as to the lower 
transaction costs that limited liability implies.41 Put simply, supporters of limited 
liability usually argue that limited liability makes it easier for entrepreneurs to 
raise the amount of capital necessary to attain optimal size.42 They assert that 
investors would not engage in activities characterized by substantial uncertain 
costs (including those provoked by bad managers) if they ran the risk of losing 
all their wealth. And they argue that by instead letting shareholders off scot-
free, a community avoids squandering the resources necessary to find 
shareholders and close legal loopholes. 
A. Limited Liability: The Free-Market View 
The free-market advocate is probably ready to acknowledge that the 
limited-liability regime is simpler. Yet, in his view, simplicity, allegedly optimal 
company size, or subsidies to risk taking are not enough to justify making the 
victim pay “the consequences that belong to the worst of all in the set of 
possible outcomes of an action.”43 Therefore, the principle of individual 
responsibility would induce the free-market supporter to consider the owner 
 
Simmons, Locke’s State of Nature, 17 POL. THEORY 449, 456 (1989). Put differently, the state should not 
give substance to the notion of social justice, let alone carry out redistribution. In this vein, therefore, 
the rights of an individual correspond to his natural rights (liberty and property), and his obligations are 
his duties to respect the natural rights of the other members of the community and to comply with the 
terms of the social contract when it exists.  
 41.  See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 270–71; Joseph Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited 
Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 424–25 (1992).  
 42.  See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the 
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985). 
 43.  Collin, supra note 25, at 286; see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward 
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1933–34 (1991) (advocating 
(proportional) liability). This triggered an intense scholarly debate. In fact, full liability would not 
prevent large corporations from coming to the surface. There is also evidence suggesting that the pool 
of shareholders would not necessarily be small (concentrated ownership) or that “the shares would be 
perceived to be particularly risky.” Peter Grossman, The Market for Shares of Companies with 
Unlimited Liability: The Case of American Express, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 63, 78 (1995). By contrast, it is 
doubtful that gate-keeping legislation and regulation under a limited-liability regime lead to “optimal” 
behavior by the managers, who might still fool shareholders and third parties. 
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liable by default in this context as well. In particular, liability is imposed for 
both the owner’s and his employees’ misdeeds, as long as his employees operate 
within an agency agreement. Whether the owner is an individual or a company 
makes no difference. Certainly, there may be situations in which a counterparty 
voluntarily agrees to deal with a limited-liability business partner. This would 
raise no problem to a free-market advocate, as long as full liability is waived 
explicitly and the waiver also includes accidents. 
In practice, a company can become an offender within two different settings: 
when it enters a contractual agreement and fails to complete the job, and when 
it experiments with innovative activities in its laboratories and causes accidental 
damage. The former case presents no particular problem, because liability in 
the presence of breach of contract is not disputed. But unless the victims have 
waived their rights, the offender is clearly responsible in the latter scenario as 
well, because one can hardly decline liability unilaterally and let the victim deal 
with the consequences. That damages are provoked by accidents makes little 
difference in assigning liability.44 Furthermore, the involvement of a government 
authority does not alter the essence of the argument. For example, it might 
happen that the local authorities allow a producer to carry out experiments with 
potentially harmful materials and agree that the tort feasor will bear only 
limited liability for the damages he might produce. Under these circumstances, 
however, either the local authorities have an explicit mandate and are 
empowered to ignore the residents’ initial right to give permission and claim 
compensation,45 or the local authorities overstep their mandate and become the 
producer’s accomplices, with whom they will thus share liability. 
B. Against Risk Spreading 
Calabresi’s emphasis on risk spreading suggests that accidents should be 
treated differently than the other categories of costs. In particular, he argues 
that society should be liable for involuntary and unpredictable torts, possibly 
for the sake of dynamic efficiency.46 
The free-market camp would object on two grounds, both of which are 
manifestations of the principle of individual responsibility mentioned earlier. 
The first ground draws on the conviction that costs are a function of knowledge 
and that the “discovery of knowledge” should develop free of artificial 
impediments. When applied to uncertain costs (including accidents), this means 
that the importance of damages also depends on the extent to which individuals 
can devise products and processes that reduce their impact. The free-market 
advocate knows neither the optimal speed of the discovery process nor the 
 
 44.  Of course, this does not imply that unlimited-liability companies are vulnerable to all uncertain 
costs. In fact, companies frequently buy insurance against risky or potential costs, so that insurance 
companies end up with the cost of uncertainty.  
 45.  It is assumed that the residents homesteaded the area before the company started operating 
and causing damages. 
 46.  See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 520–21.  
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identity of the potential discoverers. But he posits that the discovery process is 
analogous to entrepreneurship: It is driven by a mix of intellectual curiosity, 
complacency, vanity, and greed (profit seeking), and can be best performed by 
individuals who respond to those stimuli and react accordingly. And because 
legislators have rather tenuous notions about which way and how fast discovery 
should go, they should not be allowed to force its direction.47 
The second ground relates to the principle of social responsibility as a 
whole, regardless of the accidental nature of the event. Proponents of the free-
market view do not object to the existence of instruments providing broad 
coverage against catastrophic events. Unless this coverage involves protection 
against violations of one’s natural rights, however, it should be the object of 
voluntary, cooperative agreements and exchange, rather than of government 
action.48 Put differently, and in accord with the Humboldtian vision of social 
rights and obligations,49 the state should not engage in insuring against 
accidents, let alone by taxing the population at large. 
To summarize, when uncertain costs do not lead to bankruptcy, the liability 
question actually vanishes and, if insurance is indeed preferable, unlimited-
liability companies will buy insurance anyway, with no need for social risk 
sharing. For both Calabresi and the free-market adherent, then, the crucial 
question is how to treat catastrophic accidents, which cannot be neutralized 
through insurance and the cost of which cannot be covered by the firm’s net 
capital. Should these costs be borne by the shareholders (unlimited-liability 
companies), or by the other stakeholders and society at large (limited-liability 
companies)? Who is right: the free-market champion or Calabresi? 
Unfortunately, the answer will hardly come from the economics profession. 
Social scientists will have to look elsewhere. Most notably, they will have to 
look toward political philosophy: the nature of the social covenant, the meaning 
of social responsibility, and the source of legitimacy of government coercion, 
which define the extent to which private property can be violated. To define the 
default liability rule in the presence of catastrophic accidents, one should 
identify the victim at the moment that the accident hits a member of society. Is 
the victim society, of which the individual is just a component? Or is the victim 
the individual per se? 
In the former case, there is no doubt that society as a whole should pay. For 
example, suppose that a new source of energy unexpectedly becomes available. 
As a consequence of this accident, companies operating in the traditional 
mining and oil industries suddenly go broke and create significant secondary 
problems: Contracts with workers and suppliers are no longer honored. 
 
 47.  RANDALL HOLCOMBE, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 37–38 (2007). 
 48.  See, e.g., ENRICO COLOMBATTO, MARKETS, MORALS AND POLICY-MAKING 62 (2011); 
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 73–74 (1974). 
 49.  See HUMBOLDT, supra note 4. In a word, the state’s sphere is confined to the “preservation of 
security . . . . Political activity can only extend its influence to such actions as imply a direct trespass on 
the rights of others; to the task of deciding in cases of disputed rights; to redressing the wronged, and 
pursuing the wrong-doers.” Id. at 82. 
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Following from this first scenario—society is the victim—the taxpayer will 
compensate the stakeholders by paying the debts of the failed companies and 
guaranteeing unemployment benefits to those who lost their jobs. In such a 
case, the only open issue regards the features of taxation. 
If the victim of the accident turns out to be the individual, however, one has 
to evaluate the nature of the covenant between the individual and society. This 
evaluation is the essence of the second metaissue. If one believes that the 
covenant between the individual and society only includes protection against 
violence by other human beings, then the individual cannot ask society to pay 
for the damages caused by the accident. In fact, two explicit contracts are 
required: one between the potential victim and a government authority, and 
one between the government authority and the taxpayers who should provide 
the resources to pay compensation. By contrast, if one believes that the 
covenant between the individual and society also includes some kind of tacit 
collective insurance that materializes at the very moment one becomes a 
member of society, then risk spreading might be justified, and the stakeholders 
might well ask the some or all taxpayers to replace the debtor after an accident 
has struck. 
The analysis of the social covenant is well beyond the scope of this paper 
and we shall not pursue the matter further. Yet both Calabresi and free-market 
supporters would agree that the evaluation of the existence and nature of the 
social covenant is crucial, even if it pertains to the domain of political 
philosophy rather than to that of law and economics. By contrast, the 
proponents of the Chicago school are more likely to take the opposite view and 
maintain that the notion of justice is ultimately driven by efficiency, either 
because it is the only objective criterion upon which individuals might agree, or 
because this criterion would eventually prevail as a result of an evolutionary 
process in which the most efficient societies succeed at the expense of the 
others.50 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Although Calabresi’s concerns for fair redistribution are well known, he 
refrains from advocating violations of freedom of contract for the sake of 
wealth creation, let alone suggesting that judges become technocrats involved in 
cost-benefit simulations. Thus, Calabresi rejects much of the Chicago vision, 
which develops from the two Coasean principles of reciprocity and wealth 
creation.51 The same also applies to uncertainty. The Chicago approach borrows 
 
 50.  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); Richard 
Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 85 (1985).   
 51.  According to the former, the identities of the victim and of the aggressor cannot be established 
a priori, but only after the policy maker has reached his verdict on the matter. R.H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960). According to the latter, property rights should be 
assigned so as to reproduce the situation that would have emerged if the agents had been able to 
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on the neoclassical tradition and deals with uncertainty by resorting to 
regulation or judicial intervention. Calabresi, by contrast, sides with the free-
market perspective and considers uncertainty inevitable. 
In the end, the only significant gap between Calabresi and the free-market 
approach in the realm of liability regards the connection between accidental 
events and social responsibility. From the free-market vantage point, the 
treatment of an accident relates to the existence of an injurer. If there is no 
aggressor, the victim has no right to compensation and the long-standing debate 
about negligence and strict liability becomes less relevant, because no 
precaution is possible in the presence of an accident.52 Put differently, bad luck 
creates no rights and, therefore, the attribution of liability is a political decision 
that has little to do with efficiency or with natural law.53 By contrast, Calabresi’s 
perspective takes for granted the intrinsic justice of a social arrangement that 
ultimately redistributes wealth from the rich to the poor.54 However, the nature 
of this debate pertains to political philosophy, rather than to economics: Social 
responsibility ultimately depends on one’s notion of social justice and, 
therefore, of society. These are crucial questions, of course, but beyond the 
scope of this article. 
Do the above conclusions have consequences for the relevance of 
institutional economics, which is so deeply indebted to the law-and-economics 
approach? By and large, economists justify policy making by referring to the 
presence of market failures, defined as undesirable outcomes originated by 
unfettered interaction among individuals. Therefore, economists argue that 
policy makers should be responsible for creating and implementing the suitable 
social architecture and for enforcing desirable cooperation agreements that 
would hardly see the light of day spontaneously. 
Speculation about the features of the appropriate social architecture has 
inspired a substantial literature. Yet it is undeniable that the bottom line 
remains unclear and that such speculation often boils down to a set of 
tautologies. For example, economists tend to define good institutions as 
arrangements that lead to satisfactory economic performance and are accepted 
 
transfer property rights in an ideal world characterized by zero transaction costs. See id. at 16–17, 19, 
34; GEORGE STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 114 (3d ed. 1966). 
 52.  The reader might recall my definition of accident, which does not refer to unintentional 
injuries, but rather to unpredictable events. See supra Part I.A.  
 53.  Natural law refers to the individual’s right to protection and private property. In this context, 
an individual cannot be held liable if he has not done violence to the victim, and the victim has no right 
to ask for state intervention. Moreover, one may observe that the free-market view on accidents and 
liability described here is also efficient. One could hardly imagine the magnitude of the transaction 
costs involved in assigning liability for the unpredictable damages provoked by a good that has been 
previously owned by several different actors and the producer of which is no longer in business.  
 54.  From Calabresi’s perspective, therefore, the issue consists of deciding whether the damage 
originates from an accident or from another category of uncertain costs: Society is in charge of the 
burden in the case of accident, and the victim suffers the loss otherwise. See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 
527, 534. The free-market perspective is simpler: The owner always shoulders the burden. See, e.g., 
HAYEK, supra note 14; MISES, supra note 4. 
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by the community to which they apply. That is, of course, equivalent to 
“theorizing” that good formal institutions should always comply with the 
common interest: It is reasonable, but operationally unsatisfactory. Indeed, it is 
not surprising that the static explanatory power of today’s institutional 
economics is limited to underscoring the presence of transaction costs. Efforts 
to shape institutional dynamics are also rather disappointing, because path 
dependence is not really a theory about change, but about inertia until a shock 
occurs. And of course, not much can be put forward normatively, because the 
prescriptions for optimal institutional design follow one’s beliefs about the 
range of policy maker actions and the possibility of restraining policy maker 
discretion (such that these prescriptions thus fall under the purview of political 
philosophy, public-choice theory, and constitutionalism). 
To conclude, by neglecting the political–philosophical side of institutional 
analysis, the original Coasean insights have offered neither satisfactory 
explanations of the dynamic of the rules of the game nor credible normative 
prescriptions. At best, they have offered empirical investigations to prove the 
obvious: Growth suffers when entrepreneurial skills are stifled through 
regulation, expropriation, and ideological intolerance. Luckily, Calabresi seems 
to take a different and more promising route. He does not discard neoclassical 
efficiency reasoning altogether, but he is well aware of the problematic aspects 
raised by the notion of responsibility, both as the source of desirable incentives 
and as the essence of moral behavior. To be fair, Calabresi is inclined to believe 
that social responsibility might eventually be a reasonable solution to the 
thorniest situations and, therefore, he runs counter to the free-market emphasis 
on individual responsibility. Yet even the most rigid free-market advocate must 
acknowledge that Calabresi’s way of framing the law-and-economics debate is 
more fruitful than the standard neoclassical version, and that it leaves the door 
open to much-needed contributions by moral and political philosophers. The 
interaction between these disciplines and the economic way of thinking is 
indeed where institutional economics should be heading in the future. 
 
